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THE ADMINISTRATIVE CRIME, ITS CREATION AND
PUNISHMENT BY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Edmund H. Schwenk*

HE application of the penal sanction in the field of administrative
law involves mainly three problems: (r) the constitutionality of a
statute which authorizes an administrative agency to issue rules and
regulations enforceable by punishment and thus to create certain elements of crime; (2) the constitutionality of a statute which authorizes
an administrative agency to create the penalty for the violation of its
rules and regulations; and (3) the constitutionality of a statute which
authorizes an administrative agency to impose a penalty upon the delinquent. Even if the first problem can be answered in the affirmative,
two questions still remain: (a) what is the standard under which the
legislature may authorize an administrative agency to create elements
of crime? and (b) how far will the courts go in their scrutiny as to
whether or not the administrative agency is authorized to issue the
rules or regulations in a case where they are enforceable by punishment?

T

I
PowER oF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES TO DECLARE AN AcT A
CRIMINAL OFFENSE
A. Power to Create Elements of a Criminal Offense
I. Constitutional Problem of Delegation of Power
It has been maintained again and again 1 that the creation of a crime
is an "exclusive" function of the legislature, and that, consequently, it
cannot be delegated to an administrative agency. Since a crime consists
of one or several elements as well as of the penalty, it would follow
from this theory that the legislature can delegate neither the power of

* J.U.D., University of Breslau; LL.M., Tulane Law School; LL.M., Harvard
Law School; holder of the Brandeis Research Fellowship at Harvard, 1941-1942.
Author of various articles in leading American and foreign periodicals.-Ed.
1 United States v. Matthews, (D.C. Wash. 1906) 146 F. 306; United States
v. Louisville & N. R.R., (D.C. Ala. 1910) 176 F. 942; Ex parte Cox, 63 Cal. 21
(1883); Dent v. United States, 8 Ariz. 138, 71 P. 920 (1903); In re Peppers, 189
Cal. 682, 209 P. 896 (1922); Stephensen v. Wood, (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) 35 S.W.
(2d) 794, certified questions answered 119 Tex. 564, 34 S.W. (2d) 246 (1931);
Feeman v. State, 131 Ohio St. 85, 1 N.E. (2d) 620 (1936) (dictum); State v.
Maitrejean, 193 La. 824, 192 So. 361 (1939), discussed in 14 TULANE L. REv.
291 (1940), 9 FORD. L. REV. 275 (1940).

52

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 42

creating the elements of crime nor that of prescribing the penalty. Is
the power ·of creating a crime, in fact, an "exclusive" function of the
legislature?
Undoubtedly, there is some basis for the theory that this function
is "exclusively" vested in the legislature. One must not forget that
not so long ago federal rules and regulations were not required to be
published in an official register 2 and that in the states the publication
of the rules and regulations is still not necessary.3 As a result, the
public does not or even cannot know what rules are in force at any
particular time.4 In addition, most, if not all, the regulations enforceable by punishment constitute "public welfare offenses" so that they
do not require "mens rea." 5 But even tho_ugh they were not "public
welfare offenses," knowledge of the punishability would not be an
element of mens rea. 6
There is another consideration which might also have supported the
theory that the power of creating a crime is "exclusively" legislative.
The power of creating either the elements or the penalty of a crime
results in more serious consequences for the individual than the power
to issue rules and regulations which are vested merely with civil or
administrative liability. As the •Supreme Court in the state of New
York put it: 7
2

GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND COMMENTS 263 (1940).
Id.; ANDREWS, ADMINISTRATIVE LABOR LEGISLATION 103-107 (1936); Jaffe,
"Publication of Administrative Rules and Orders," 24 A.B.A.J. 393 at 397 (1938).
4
See Witte, "A Break for the Citizen," 9 STATE GoVT. 73 (1936); Carr,
"Ignorance of the Law," id. 149; GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND
COMMENTS 263 ( l 940).
5
Professor Sayre, "Public Welfare Offenses," 3 3 CoL. L. REv. 55 at 72-73
(1933), enumerates the following groups of offenses not requiring mens rea: "(1)
Illegal sales of intoxicating liquors: (a) sales of prohibited beverages, (b) sales to
minors, (c) sales to habitual drunkards, (d) sales to Indians or other prohibited persons,
(e) sales by methods prohibited by law. (2) Sales of impure or adulterated food or
drugs: (a) sales of adulterated or impure milk; (b) sales of adulterated butter or
oleomargarine. (3) Sales of misbranded articles. (4) Violations of anti-narcotic acts.
(5) Criminal nuisances: (a) annoyances or injuries to the public health, safety, repose
or comfort; (b) obstruction of highways. (6) Violations of traffic regulations. (7)
Violations of motor-vehicle laws. (8) Violations of general police regulations, passed
for the safety, health, or well-being of the community."
6
Hall and Seligman, "Mistake of Law and Mens Rea," 8 UNiv. CHI. L. REV.
641 (1941); Perkins, "Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law," 88 UNiv. PA. L.
REV. 35 (1939); Kohler, "Ignorance or Mistake of Law as a Defense in Criminal
Cases," 40 DicK. L. REv. l l 3 ( l 936); Stumberg, "Mistake of Law in Texas Criminal
Cases," 15 TEX. L. REv. 287 (1937).
7
Barker v. People, 3 Cow. (N.Y.S.Ct.) 686 at 704 (1824), quoted in People
- v. Grant, 242 App. Div. 310 at 3u, 275 N.Y.S. 74 (1934), affd. 267 N.Y. 508,
196 N.E. 553 (1935).
3
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" ... It is a power to take life and liberty, and all the rights of
both, when the sacrifice is necessary to the peace, order, and safety
to the community. This general authority is vested in the legislature, and as it is one of the most ample of their powers, its due
exercise is among the highest of their duties."
Finally, the doctrine of the "exclusive" power of the legislature
to create the elements and penalty of a crime might have its source in
a third consideration. There are no common-law crimes within the area
of the federal government 8 or within that of some states.9 Hence if an
act is to constitute a crime, it must be created by a statute, and by a
statute only.10
Are these arguments sound? The first argument,-that is, the lack
of an official register for the publication of rules and regulations,-has
undoubtedly persuasive force. 11 It is, however, no longer true in regard
to federal agencies.12 The states which have not followed the example
of the federal government in creating an official register for the publication of rules and regulations often provide that the rules and regu8 United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch (II U.S.) 32 (1812); United States v.
Coolidge, 1 Wheat. (14 U.S.) 415 (1816); United States v. Miller, (D.C. Wash.
1916) 236 F. 798; Hamburg-American S.P. Co. v. United States, 163 C.C.A. (2d)
79, 250 F. 747 (1918); Steigleder v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th, 1928) 25 F. (2d)
959; Wilson v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th, 1935) 77 F. (2d) 236; Fulbright v.
United States, (C.C.A. 8th, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 210; Norton v. United States (C.C.A.
9th, 1937) 92 F. (2d) 753.
9
People v. Whipple, 100 Cal. App. 261, 279 P. 1008 (1929); People v. Corder,
306 Ill. 264, 137 N.E. 845 (1922); Robertson v. State, 207 Ind. 374, 192 N.E.
887 (1935); State v. Campbell, 217 Iowa 848, 251 N.W. 717 (1934); State v.
Snowden, 174 La. 156, 14 So. 9 (1893); State v. Sperry-Hutchinson Co., 55 Mont.
555, 179 P. 460 (1919); Lane v. State, 120 Neb. 302, 232 N.W. 96 (1930); People
v. Ingber, 248 N.Y. 302, 162 N.E. 87 (1928); State v. Huffman, 131 Ohio St.
27, I N.E. (2d) 313 (1936); Multnomah County Fair Assn. v. Langley, 140 Ore.
172, 13 P. (2d) 354 (1932).

10

See 35 HARV. L. REV. 952 at 955 (1922). A similar situation exists in
Louisiana, where all the crimes must be statutory. See State v. Maitrejean, 193 La.
824, 192 So. 361 (1939). The same is true of California, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Montana, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Oregon and Texas. See MICHAEL AND
WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION: CASES, STATUTES AND COMMENTARIES IO'l4-I075 (1940).
11
The lack of an official register for the publication of regulations has been mentioned in United States v. Louisville & N.R.R., (D.C. Ala. 1910) 176 F. 942; United
States v. Matthews, (D.C. Wash. 1906) 146 F. 306; United States v. Minchew, (D.
C. Fla. 1935) 10 F. Supp. 906.
12

seq.

Federal Register Act, 49 Stat. L. 500 (1935), 44 U.S.C. (1940), § 301 et
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lations shall be published in the way prescribed by the particular act.13
The argument that the power of creating a crime affects the individual
more severely than that of creating civil or administrative liability is
of psychological rather than legal nature. If the legislature may delegate power to administrative agencies to fill out the details of a legislative act, the nature of the sanctions should not bar them from doing
so. The law-abiding individual is not concerned with the character of
the sanction, but with the legislative·command. Finally, the third argument seems to be a non sequitur. The fact that there are no commonlaw crimes within the jurisdiction of the federal government or within
that of a state means merely that the accused must not be convicted
without a legislative basis. Whether and to what extent the legislative
basis must be furnished by the legislature rather than by an administrative agency is a different problem.
(a) Attitude of the Supreme Court of the United States
It was as early as r835 that the Supreme Court of the United
States for the first time was faced with the problem whether or not an
administrative agency may issue-~ regulation which may be the basis
of a conviction. In United States v. Bailey,14 the defendant was indicted for false swearing under the Acts of Congress of March I, 1823
and March 3, 1825. The Act of March r, 1823, provided that:
"If any person shall swear or •affirm falsely, touching the
expenditure of public money, or· in support of any claim against
the United States, he or she shall, upon conviction thereof, suffer
as for wilful and corrupt perjury."
The Act of March 3, r825, section r3, declared:
"If any person, in any case, matter, hearing, or other proceeding, when an oath or affirmation shall be required to be taken or
administered under or by any law or laws of the United States,
shall, upon taking such oath or affirmation, knowingly and willingly swear or affirm falsely, every person so offending shall be
deemed guilty of perjury...."
The oath was administered by a justice of the peace for Bath county,
in the state of Kentucky, and taken with a view of obtaining money
from the government. The Secretary of the Treasury, whose duty it
was to decide on the claims, had issued a regulation prescribing that
18
People v. Soule, 238 Mich. 130, 213 N.W. 195 (1927). But see also Goodlove v. Logan, 217 Iowa 98, 251 N.W. 39 (1933); State v. Retowski, 6 W.W. Harr.
(36 Del.) 330, 175 A. 325 (1934); State v. Grimshaw, 49 Wyo. 192, 53 P. (2d)
13 '(1935), in all of which the absence of provision for adequate publication contributed to the invalidation of the statute involved.
14
9 Pet. (34 U.S.) 238 (1835) ..
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the claims should be substantiated by oath and that any justice of the
peace of any of the states of the United States was authorized to administer an oath in such a case. The defense was that under the federal
acts only a federal officer could administer that oath, so that the Secretary of the Treasury had no power to authorize a state justice of the
peace to administer it. Although the controversy thus focused upon the
question of authorization, the majority of the Court, in holding that
the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to issue the regulation,
assumed the constitutionality of the acts which delegated to him the
power of creating some element of perjury. Justice McLean, however,
in his dissenting opinion said: "It is a power which belongs to the legislative department, and can nowhere else be exercised." 15
Caha v. United States,16 a case similar to that of United States v.
Bailey, was decided in 1893. Caha had been convicted of perjury under
section 5392 of the Revised Statutes.11 The perjury was committed in
a contest in a local land office in respect to the validity of a homestead
entry, the oath having been administered by one of the land officers
before whom the contest had been carried on.
By rules of the Interior Department, express provision was made
for the contest before the local land officers in respect to homestead as
well as pre-emption entries and for the taking of testimony before such
officers and for regular, formal trials, with the right of appeal to the
Commissioner of the General Land Office, and from there to the Secretary of the Interior. However, there was no statute in terms authorizing
a contest before the local land office in respect to homestead entries,
though there was a general grant of authority to the Land Department
to prescribe appropriate regulations for the disposition of public land
and also a specific act of Congress authorizing contests before the local
land officers in case of pre-emption. Again, the controversy centered
upon the authorization of the Interior Department to issue rules providing for the administration of oath before the local land officers in
respect to homestead entries. As in United States v. Bailey, the Court,
by answering the question of authorization in the affirmative, impliedly
15

Id. at 263.
152 U.S. 211, 14 S. Ct. 513 (1893).
17
Section 5392 of the Revised Statutes reads as follows: "Every person who, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer or person, in any case in wluch
a ltJW of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify,
declare, depose or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition,
or certificate by him subscribed is true, wilfully and contrary to such oath states or
subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury...•" (Italics added.)
16
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assumed the constitutionality of the delegation of power to the Interior
Department.
For the first time, in In re Kollock 18 the issue of delegation of
power to create the elements of crime was argued by the parties. An
act of Congress 19 required retail dealers in oleomargarine to pack the
oleomargarine sold by them in suitable wooden or paper packages,
"marked, stamped, and branded as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, shall prescribe." Kollock had disregarded the regulations of the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue. His defense was that the statute was invalid,
because it did not define what act done or committed should constitute
a criminal offense, but delegated to the commissioner the power to
determine them. The Court took the position that the penal sanction,
which the act provided for the violation of regulations, did not take
the case out of the general problem of delegation of power and that,
therefore, the general principles of delegation of power applied. This
is the language of the Court:
"The act ... is on its face an act for levying taxes, and ... its
primary object must be assumed to be the raising of revenue ... .
[As such] the designation of the stamps, marks and brands is
merely in the discharge of an administrative function and falls
within the numerous instances of regulation needful to the operation of the machinery of particular laws, authority to make which
has always been recognized as within the competency of the legislative power to confer." 20
When, then, United States v. Grimaud 21 was submitted to the
Supreme Court of the United States, the precedents of United States
v. Bailey, Caha v. United States, and In re Kollock imposed the ruling
upon the Court. The defendants in United States v. Grimaud were
indicted for grazing sheep on the Sierra Forest Reserve without having
obtained permission which the regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture required. They demurred on the ground that the Forest Reserve
Act of r89I was unconstitutional in so f?,r as it delegated the power to
make rules and regulations, a violation of which would be a penal
18

165 U.S. 526, 17 S. Ct. 444 (1897).
24 Stat. L. 209, c. 840 (1886).
20
165 U.S. at 536.
21
220 U.S. 506, 31 S. Ct. 480 (1910). The case of Light v. United States,
220 u:s. 523, 31 S. Ct. 485 (1910), was decided at the same time and upon the
authority of United States v. Grimaud.
19

1 943]

THE ADMINISTRATIVE CRIME

57

offense.22 Thus, the only problem presented was whether the statute
could authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to create the elements of
crime. The Court answered the question in the affirmative. The fact
that the rules or regulations furnish some element of crime was not
considered to raise them from an administrative to a legislative character, since the violation was made a crime not by the administrative
agency, but by the legislature. Said the Court:
cc • •• But the authority to make administrative rules is not a
delegation of legislative power, nor are such rules raised from an
administrative to a legislative character because the violation
thereof is punished as a public offense." 23

And also:
cc • •• A violation of reasonable rules regulating the use and
occupancy of the property is made a crime, not by the Secretary,
but by Congress. The statute, not the Secretary, fixes the penalty.... The Secretary did not exercise the legislative power of
declaring the penalty or fixing the punishment for grazing sheep
without a permit, but the punishment is imposed by the act itself.
The offense is not against the Secretary, but, as the indictment
properly concludes 'contrary to the laws of the United States and
the peace and dignity thereof.'" 24

Is it true that the violation of the regulations is made a crime by the
act of the legislature rather than by the administrative agency?
The reasoning of the Supreme Court would be correct if the penalty
were the only essential of a criminal offense. However, a crime consists of two components: the elements (objective and subjective) as
well as the penalty.25 Consequently, if the legislative act does not contain both, the criminal offense has not come into existence. The act
which authorizes the agency to issue the rules ind regulations to be
22

The act provides that the Secretary "may make such rules and regulations and
establish such service as will insure the objects of such reservation, namely, to regulate
their occupancy and use and to preserve the forests thereon from destruction; and any
violation of the provisions of this act or such rules and regulations shall be punished as
is provided in" § 5388, p. 1044 of the Revised Statutes, as amended. 30 Stat. L.
35 (1897), amending 26 Stat. L. II03 (1891).
23
220 U.S. at 521.
24 Id. 522, 523.
25
See authorities, cited in Schwenk, "Criminal Codification and General Principles of Criminal Law in Argentina, Mexico, Chile and the United States; A Comparative Study," 4 LA. L. REv. 3 5 l at 3 57, note 3 l ( l 942); see also Schwenk,
"Criminal Codification and General Principles of Criminal Law in Germany and the
United States-A Comparative Study," 15 TULANE L. REV. 541 at 550 (1941).
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enforced by a penalty does not contain the final elements of the offense.
If an indictment were based upon the violation of such an act, it. would
be quashed on the ground that the language of the act is too vague and
indefinite and, therefore, violates the due process clause of the Constitution.26 As a result, the existence of the regulations is necessary to
eliminate the vagueness and indefiniteness of the criminal elements and
thus to take the act out of the operation of the due process clause. 21
They are a condicio sine qua non for the validity of the criminal provision. Hence it can hardly be said that "the violation is made a crime
,not by the Secretary, but by Congress."
Though the reasoning of the Court appears to be questionable, the
result is justifiable. Once it is admitt!;!d that the creation of a criminal
o:ffense is not the "exclusive" function of the legislature, there is no
reason why the administrative agency may not participate in the creation
26
United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 41 S. Ct. 298 (1921);
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S. Ct. 618 (1939); United States v. Foote,
(D.C. Del. 1942) 42 F. Supp. 717. See also Aigler, "Legislation in Vague or General
'Terms," 21 M1cH. L. REv. 831 (1923); 45 HARv. L. REV. 160 (-1931); 8 True.
L. REv. 253 at 258-260 (1930). In re Peppers, 189 Cal. 682, 209 P. 896 (1922),
the court said that the act itself is too vague and indefinite to be the basis for an indictment and that the regulations would make it certain and definite. In spite of the
appreciation for the necessity of the regulations, the court declared them invalid on
the ground that the legislature could not delegate the power to declare what acts or
omissions on the part of an individual are unlawful.
' 21 An excellent illustration for this point is presented by United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 53 S. Ct. 42 (1932). The case involved
§ 8 of the Federal Food and Drug Act 'of 1906, 34 Stat. L. 768, as amended by 37
Stat. L. 732 (1913), which required that packaged goods be marked with their net
weight subject to a proviso that "reasonable variations shall be permitted." The majority of the court took the position that the language alone would by reason of the
vagueness render the statute, in this particular aspect, void for indefiniteness and lacking
in due process. They found, however, that the language quoted was modified by a
subsequent phrase, "by rules and regulations made in accordance with section 3 of this
Act." Section 3 provided for joint uniform regulations by the Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, and Treasury "for carrying out the-provisions of this Act." So construed, the statute was constitutional and not void for indefiniteness.
A like analysis was made in In re Peppers, 189 Cal. 682, 209 P. 896 (1922).
Finally, however, the court held the statute invalid, because the legislature could not
delegate the power to declare "what acts or omissions on the part of an individual are
unlawful."
In United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 41 S. Ct. 298 (1921),
' an indictment was based upon the Wartime Food Control or Lever Act. That act made
it criminal to make any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in handling or dealing
with certain commodities, denominated "necessaries." Due to the fact that no regulatory power was provided for determining whether a charge was unjust or unreasonable,
the act was said to result in such uncertainty as to be in violation of the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment.
See Lee, "Legislative and Interpretive Regulations," 29 GEo. L. J. I ( I 94;0).
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of a criminal offense under the rules of delegation of power, i.e., in
the event that the legislature has set a sufficient primary standard in
the act. Whether this participation applies not only to the creation
of the elements but also to the penalty seems to depend merely on
whether or not it is possible to set forth a sufficient standard not only
for the determination of the elements, but also for that of the penalty.
As far as the creation of the elements of a criminal offense is concerned,
the Grimaud case has definitely settled the problem.
In the case of McKinley v. United States 28 the issue was again
raised by way of defense against the indictment. However, the Court
rejected it, firmly relying on the Grimaud case.29 Though the more
recent cases of Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,8° Schechter Poultry Co.
v. United States 81 and Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator 82 also involved the validity of regulations enforceable by penalty, the power of
the administrative agency to create the elements of a criminal offense
was not drawn into the controversy.

(b)

Attitude of the State Courts

In CQntrast with the Supreme Court of the United States, state
courts have taken more literally the doctrine of the exclusive function
of the legislature to create a criminal offense. Thus, the California
28

249 U.S. 397, 39 S. Ct. 324 (1918).
The Court said, 249 U.S. at 399: "Congress having adopted restrictions designed to guard and promote the health and efficiency of the men composing the
army, in a matter so obvious as that embodied in the statute under consideration, may
leave details to the regulation of the head of an executive department, and punish
those who violate the restrictions. This is also well settled by the repeated decisions of
this court."
so 293 U.S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241 (1935). See also (all issued in 1935), 15 BoST.
UNIV. L. REv. 324; 23 CAL. L. REv. 435; 35 CoL. L. REV. 280; 4 FoRD. L. REV.
341; 23 GEo. L. J. 320; 3 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 391; 48 HARV. L. REV. 798; 29
ILL. L. REV. 809; IO lNo. L. J. 343; 19 MINN. L. REv. 801; I Mo. L. REv. 68;
12 N.Y. UNiv. L. Q. REv. 520; 9 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 370; 8 So. CAL. L.
REv. 226; 13 TEX. L. REv. 364; 2 UNiv. Cm. L. REv. 632; 83 UNIV. PA. L. REv.
526.
81
295 U.S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837 (1935). See also (all issued in 1935), 49 HARV.
L. REV. 332; 15 BosT. UN1v. L. REv. 777; 35 CoL. L. REv. 934; 4 FoRD. L. REv.
457; 33 MICH. L. REv. 1254; 20 MINN. L. REv. 86; I Mo. L. REv. 68; 12 N.Y.
UNIV. L.Q. REV. 667; Corwin, "The Schechter Case-Landmark or What?" 13 id.
151; IO ST. JoHN's L. REV. II9; Fuchs, "A Postscript-The Schechter Case," 20
ST. LoUis L. REv. 297; 9 TEMPLE L.Q. 451; 14 TEX. L. REv. IOI; 10 UNiv.
Crn. L. REv. 106; 22 VA. L. REv. 92; I I Wis. L. REv. 88.
82
312 U.S. 126, 61 S. Ct. 524 (1941). For comments, see 29 GEo. L.J. 882
(1941}; IO GEo. WASH. L. REv. 219 (1941); 35 ILL. L. REv. 840 (1941}; 25
MINN. L. REv. 785 (1941); 8 UNJv. Cm. L. REv. 548 (1941).
29
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Supreme Court reached the conclusion that an administrative _agency
cannot be authorized to issue rules and regulations which constitute the
elements of a criminal offense, the penalty of which is provided in the
act of the legislature. Thus the case of Ex parte Cox 33 involved the
California State Viticultural Act of March 4, I 8 8 I,34 in which power
was conferred upon the Board of State Viticultural Commissioners to
issue quarantine rules and regulations. 35 The wilful violation of the
quarantine regulations was declared a misdemeanor by the act. The
petitioner for habeas corpus, having been convicted of the violation of
those regulations, insisted upon the invalidity of the act on the ground
that it delegated legislative power to the board, i.e., the power to create
a misdemeanor. The court invalidated the act and issued the writ of
habeas corpus.36 In a similar case 37 involving the California Eruit and
Vegetable Standardization Act,38 the California court reached the same
result.
In Dent v. United States 39 the Arizop.a Supreme Court declared
the Forest Reserve Act of June 4, 1897,40 invalid 41 for the reason that
the regulations of the administrative agency were vested with a crimi33

63 Cal. 21 (1883).
Cal. Stat. ( l 8 8 1), p. 5 l.
35 The act conferred power to declare and enforce "rules and regulations in the
nature of quarantine, to govern the manner of, restrain, or prohibit the importation
into the State, and the distribution and disposal within the State, of all vines, vine
cuttings .•• [and] •empty fruit boxes...."
3~ It was said by the court, 63 Cal. at 21: "The legislature had no authority to
confer upon the officer or board the power of declaring what acts should constitute a
misdemeanor. The legislative power of the State is vested in the Senate and Assembly.
That power could not, as in the case before us, be delegated to the officer or board."
37
ln re Peppers, 189 Cal. 682, 209 P. 896 (1922).
38
California Fruit and Vegetable Standardization Act, Cal. Stat. (1921), p. 1234,
§ 10, provides that "Oranges shall be considered unfit for shipment when frosted to
the extent of endangering the reputation of the citrus industry, if shipped." Sec. l 5
declares that "The Director of Agriculture is empowered to define, promulgate and
enforce all such rules and regulations, as may be deemed necessary to carry out the
proyisions of the act." Sec. l 6 provides that "The Director of Agriculture and his
duly appointed agents or employees may investigate and certify to shippers and other
interested parties the quality and condition of fruit, vegetables and other farm products
under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe."
39
8 Ariz. 138, 71 P. 920 (1903).
40
Act of June 4, 1897, 30 Stat. L. 33.
41 The court declared, 8 Ariz. at 147: "Whether or not in all cases the authority
of the several heads of the departments of the federal government to make regulations
for their respective departments is limited to the precise and literal- terms of the acts
of Congress applicable thereto, we think that, in so far as by such regulations an act is
defined to be a crime which is not so defined by any public law, and which, without
such regulation, would not be a crime, or punishable as such, it is an exercise of law34
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nal sanction, and in Feeman 'V. State 42 the Supreme Court of Ohio
expressed language to the effect that if the elements of the criminal
offense fixed in the regulations had not been also contained in the act,
no indictment could have been brought against the violator of the regulations.48 In a rather recent case, State v. Maitrejean, 44 the Supreme
Court of Louisiana took a definite stand for the doctrine of the "exclusive" power of the legislature to create the elements of a criminal
offense. In the old-fashioned way the court concluded from the separation of power provided in the Constitution of Louisiana 45 that the state
legislature could not delegate the power of creating a criminal offense.
There is no more strength to this theory than there is to the fact that
the Constitution of Louisiana expressly provides for certain administrative agencies to which legislative power may be delegated 46 or that all
the crimes in Louisiana must be statutory.47
Fortunately, the majority of state courts 48 have not blocked the
path for progress in the field of administrative law by adhering to an
unfounded principle, but they have followed the rule of United States
v. Grimaud.
making power, vested by the constitution, not in such official, but in Congress alone,
and as such is unconstitutional."
42
131 Ohio St. 85, 1 N.E. (2d) 620 (1936).
48 Said the court, 13 1 Ohio St. at 8 8: "Had the state boards adopted a regulation
making some act unlawful which the Legislature did not define as being unlawful, there
would be reason for the contention that such a regulation would constitute a delegation
of legislative power."
44
193 La. 824, 192 So. 361 (1939), discussed in 14 TULANE L. REV. 291
(1940) and 9 FORDHAM L. REV. 275 (1940).
45 Art. II, § 1, of the Constitution of Louisiana of 1921 declares that "The
powers of the government of the State of Louisiana shall be divided into three distinct
departments-legislative, executive, and judicial." Art. III, § I, reads as follows:
"The legislative power of the State shall be vested in a Legislature, which shall consist
of a Senate and a House of Representatives."
46 The Louisiana Public Service Commission is given power by the Constitution
of Louisiana both to punish for contempt and to provide penalties for violation of its
regulations. La. Const. (1921), Art 6, §§ 4-6. See State ex rel. Milling v. Louisiana
Public Service Commission, 154 La. 752, 98 So. 175 (1923); Louisiana Public Service
Commission ex rel. Yazoo & M.V.R.R. v. Johnson Motors Freight Lines, (La. Pub.
Serv. Comm.) P.U.R. 1929C 122. See 14 TULANE L. REv. 291 (1940).
47
State v. Gaster, 45 La. Ann. 636, 12 So. 739 (1893), Crimes Act of May 4,
1805, Orleans Terr. Laws (1805), C.50. See Marr, "The Necessity of a Criminal
Code for Louisiana," 4 TuLANE L. REv. 18 (1929). Cf. notes 9 and 10, supra.
•
48 State v. Normaud, 76 N.H. 541, 85 A. 899 (1913); State v. Dixon; 335 Mo.
478, 73 S.W. (2d) 385 (1934); Marsh v. Bartlett, 343 Mo. 526, 121 S.W. (2d)
737 (1938); Kryder v. State, 214 Ind. 419, 15 N.E. (2d) 386 (1938); State v.
Strayer, 230 Iowa 1027, 299 N.W. 912 (1941); Tuttle v. Wood, (Tex. Civ. App.
1931) 35 S.W. (2d) 1061; Howard v. State, 154 Ark. 430, 242 S.W. 818 (1922).
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Standard for the Delegation of Power
It is the settled law that an act of the legislature which delegates
regulatory power to an administrative agency must set forth a sufficient
primary standard so that it will be canalized within banks that will
keep it from over:flowing.49 The sufficiency of the standard is the crucial problem and has given rise to a great deal of litigation. Do courts
apply a stricter test for the standard if the rules and regulations are
vested with a penal sanction? In the cases preceding the Grimaud
case 50 the question had not even been argued before the Supreme
Court. In the Grimaud case the Supreme Court tested the sufficiency
of the primary standard by reference to cases in which either civil or
administrative liability was attached to the violation of the regulations. 51 This fact indicates that the Supreme Court applies the same
test in a case where the legislative act provides for the issuance of regulations enforceable by penal sanction as• it does in a case where the
regulations are sanctioned by civil or administrative liability. However,
in the case of Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,62 the criminal sanction of
the regulations issued by the President undoubtedly contributed to the
invalidation of section 9(c) of the National Recovery Act. The Court
found that a finding of facts by the President should have been required by the N .R.A. all the more since the citizen was exposed to
punishment upon violation of those regulations. This is what the Court
said:
·
'
" ... If the citizen is to be punished-for the crime of violating
a legislative order of an executive officer, or of a board or commission, due process of law requires that it shall appear that the order
is within the authority of the officer, board or commission, and, if
2.

49

Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837 (1935);
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241 (1935); Opp Cotton
Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 61 S. Ct. 524 (1941); Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 3n U.S. 642, 61 S. Ct. 317 (1941). See
also Weeks, "Legislative Power versus Delegated Legislative Power," 25 GEo. L.J. 314
(1937); Cheadle, "Th<t Delegation of Legislative Functions," 27 YALE L.J. 892
(1918).
50 United States v. Bailey, 9 Pet. (34 U.S.) 238 (1835); United States v. Eaton,
144 U.S. 677, 12 S. Ct. 764 (1891); Caha v. United States, 152 U.S. 2n, 14 S. Ct.
513 (1893); In re Kollock, 165 U.S. 526, 17 S. Ct. 444 (1897).
51 Reference is made to Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois Central R.R.,
215 U.S. 452, 30 S. Ct. 155 (1910); Interstate Commerce Commission v.. Chicago,
~.I. & P. R.R., 218 U.S. 88, 30 S Ct. 651 (1910); St Louis, J.M. & S. R.R. v.
Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 28 S. Ct. 616 (1908); Cosmos Exploration Co. v. Gray Eagle
Oil Co., 190 U.S. 301, 23 S. Ct. 692, 24 S. Ct. 866 (1902).
52
293 U.S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241 (1935).
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that authority depends on determinations of fact, those determinations must be shown." 53
In the Schechter case 54 weight was also given to the penal character of the "Live Poultry Code" set up under section 3 of the N .R.A.
In holding that section unconstitutional, Chief Justice Hughes said for
the Court:
" ... If the codes have standing as penal statutes, this must be
due to the e:ffect of the executive action. But Congress cannot
delegate legislative power to the President to exercise an unfettered discretion to make whatever laws he thinks may be needed
or advisable for the rehabilitation and expansion of trade industry." 55
In the case of Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator,56 which upheld
the authority of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of
the Department of Labor to fix minimum wages, neither the petitioner
for the injunction nor the Court paid attention to the penal sanction of
the regulations 57 which the administrator had issued in conformance
with the power delegated by the act. Evidently, the safeguards provided in the act were so strong that even the penal sanction of the regulations could not lead to any other result.
In the states the penal character of the rules and regulations of an
administrative agency has also been used as an additional argument to
invalidate an act of the legislature on the ground that it lacks a sufficient
primary standard. Thus, in Darweger v. Staats,5 8 followed by People
v. Greenbaum,5 9 the New York Court of Appeals, in determining the
constitutionality of the N. ew York "baby N .R.A.," 60 ruled that the act
58

293 U.S. at 432.
Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837 (1935).
55
295 U.S. at 537-538.
GS 312 U.S. 126, 61 s. Ct. 524 (1941).
57
The violation of the regulation of the minimum wages issued by the administrator is punishable according to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. L. 1062
(1938), §§ 16 (b), 6 (a) (4), 21 U.S.C. (1940), §§ 216 (b) 206 (a) (4).
58
267 N.Y. 290, 196 N.E. 61 (1935), discussed in 4 BROOKLYN L. REv. 458
(1935); 20 CoRN. L.Q. 504 (1935); 10 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 124 (1935); 20 MINN.
L. REV. 3II (1936).
59
244 App. Div. 778, 280 N.Y.S. 771 (1935).
60
N.Y. Laws (1933), c.781. It provided, as paraphrased in the headnote, 267
N.Y. 290, that "upon filing with the Secretary of the State of certified copies of each
code, agreement, license, rule or regulation, approved by the President and in effect
pursuant to title I of the National Industrial Recovery Act (48 Stat. L. 195), such
code, agreement, license, rule or regulation shall be the standard of fair competition
within this State for the trade or industry to which it pertains as to transactions intrastate in character."
54
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was unconstitutional for complete want of a primary standard, adding:

.

" ... The delegation of its [ the legislature's] power is even
more extreme, for it makes it a misdemeanor for any citizen to
violate any rule or regulation hereafter made by these authorities." 61
.,.
To summarize, the cases decided by the federal, as well as by the
state courts, suggest that the test for the standard -within which administrative agencies may issue rules and regulations does not change, even
though these rules and regulations are enforced by criminal rather
than by civil or administrative liability. However, once the inadequacy
of the standard is established on the basis of general principles of delegation of power, the courts are readily inclined to consider the criminal
sanction of the rules and regulations as an additional argument for the
invalidation of the legislative act.

3. Statutory Authorization
Aside from the two constitutional issues ( admissibility of creating
the elements of a criminal o:ffense and sufficiency of primary standard),
a third problem may arise as soon as the administrative agency has
availed itself of the power to issue rules and regulations. It is selfevident that the rules and regulations must not exceed the authority
set forth in the legislative act. However, the authority provided in the
act is nothing but a statutory provision, and, therefore, subject to statutory interpretation. In the event the rules and regulations are not
vested, with a penal sanction, the general principles of interpretation
apply. However, if a criminal liability attaches to them, stricter rules of
interpretation might be called for.
Strangely, in the first case in which this problem was involved,
United States v. Bailey,62 the Supreme Court of the United States
showed an extremely liberal attitude in spite of the penal nature of the
sanction with which the regulation was vested. The case involved the
validity of a regulation by the Secretary of the Treasury authorizing
any justice of the peace of any of the states to administer the oath required for a claim against the federal government.63 There was no
express authority in any legislative act for this regulation. However,
the Supreme Court contented itself with the existence of an implied
'authority, when it said:
" ... It is a general principle of law, in the construction of all
powers of this sort, that where the end is required, the appropriate
61

Darweger v. Staats, 267 N.Y. 290 at 307, 196 N.E. 61 (1935).
9 Pet. (34 U.S.) 238 (1835).
63
The facts are more fully stated at note 14, supra.

62
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means are given. It is the duty of the secretary to adjust and settle
these claims., and in order to do so, he must have authority to
require suitable vouchers and evidence of the facts, which are to
establish the claim." 6 ~
Again, in Caha v. United States,65 there was no express authority
for the Secretary of the Interior to provide for the administration of
an oath before the local land office in respect to homestead entries,
though there was a general grant of authority to the Land Department
to prescribe appropriate regulations for the disposition of the public
land and there was a specific act of Congress authorizing contests before
the local land officers in respect to pre-emption. Upon the authority of
United States v. Bailey, the Court thought that an implied authority
was sufficient.66 In both cases, the Court established the theory that any
express authority carries with it a "necessary and proper authority" to
reach the purpose of the legislative act.
On the other hand, in United States v. Eaton,61 the Supreme Court
took the opposite position. The regulation of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue imposed upon wholesale dealers in oleomargarine
the duty to keep a certain book and make monthly returns. 68 The act
itself provided for such a duty only in regard to manufacturers of
oleomargarine,69 though it authorized the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue to issue all needful regulations for the carrying into effect of
the act 10 and provided for punishment for a violation of any of his
regulations. 71 Undoubtedly the Court could have found that the regu9 Pet. at 255.
1sz U.S. 211, 14 S. Ct. 513 (1893), facts stated supra at note 16.
66
There was no statute in terms authorizing a contest before the local land office
in respect to homestead entries, though "the validity of such contest had been again
and again expressly recognized by Congress." The Court said, I 52 U.S. at 220: "All
that can be said is that a place and an occasion and an opportunity were provided by the
regulations of the department, at which the defendant committed the crime of perjury
in violation of Section 5392."
'
67
144 U.S. 677, 12 S. Ct. 764 (1891).
68
The regulation provided: "Wholesale dealers in oleomargarine will keep a book
(Form 61) and make a monthly return on Form 217, showing the oleomargarine
received by them ...."
69
Sec. 5 of the Act of August 2, 1886, 24 Stat. L. 209, c. 840, provided:
" ••• every manufacturer of oleomargarine ••. shall keep such books and render such
returns of materials and products ••• as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with
the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, may, by regulation, require."
70 Sec. 20 stated: "The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of
the Secretary of the Treasury, may make all needful regulations for the carrying into
effect of this act."
71 Sec. 1 8 declared: "If any manufacturer of oleomargarine, any dealer therein or
any importer or exporter thereof shall knowingly or willfully omit, neglect, or refuse
to do, or cause to be done, any of the things required by law in the carrying on or
64
65

66

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 42

lation under consideration was covered by the "necessary and proper
authority" that empowered the commissioner to "make all needful
regulations for the carrying into effect of the act.'' Instead, the Court
held that the act expressly imposed the duty of keeping books and
making returns upon manufacturers only, and that it could not be construed as imposing a like duty upon wholesale dealers by inference
from the necessary and proper authority clause.
In the states, courts have followed the approach in ·United States ·
v. Eaton rather than that in United States v. Bailey and Caha v. United
States. In numerous cases; they have taken pains in examining whether
the regulation in question is inside or outside the statutory scope of
authority. Thus, in Reims v. State,72 an Alabama case, the statute 73
empowered the State Live Stock Sanitary Board to make rules or
regulations affecting "quarantined stock" on "quarantined places."
Regulation 8, the basis of the indictment in the case, went further and
imposed certain duties without regard to the fact whether the cattle
or places were quarantined. Consequently, the court held the regulation· outside the granted authority and invalid. No consideration was
urged or given for an "implied- necessary and proper clause" broadening the authority of the administrative agency.
In the Delaware case of State v. Retowski,H the court emphasized
with particular clarity that the existence of a penal sanction as a means
of enforcement of the regulations requires an especially accurate scrutiny
as to whether or not the order falls within the scope of the authority
conferred by the statute. Said the court:
" ... it is ... the duty of the courts ... to scrutinize the case
with especial care, for it must clearly appear that the order is one
which falls within the scope of the authority conferred. . ..
"The rule in question is legislative in character, not administrative. Even if considered administrative, it is unreasonable, and
'outside the circle' of that which the act treats as unlawful if done.
It adds to and amends the Act, and accordingly must be held to be,
void ...." 75
This scrutiny reached a climax in the Kentucky case of Bloemer v.
Turner,7 6 where a statute regulated the manufacture and sale of con-.
conducting of his business, or shall do anything by this act prohibited, if there be no
specific penalty or punishment imposed by any other section of this act ... he shall
pay a penalty of one thousand dollars...." ,
72
17 Ala. App. 128, 82 So. 576 (1919).
73
Ala. Code (1907), § 763.
74
6 W.W. Harr. (36 Del.) 330, 175 A. 325 (1934).
75
36 Del. at 335.
76
281 Ky. 832, 137 S.W. (2d) 387 (1939).
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centrated commercial feeding stuff. It required the percentage of nutritious qualities of concentrated commercial food to be printed on the
label or tag of each package. It also authorized the Director of the
Agriculture Experiment Station to adopt standards for concentrated
commercial feeding stuffs and make the necessary regulations. The
director ordered the printing of the percentage of water of such food
on the label, although the statute spoke only of the percentage of fat
and protein. Again, the strict interpretation of the authority in compliance with the language of the statute gave rise to the invalidation
of the regulation as a statutory ultra vires act.
The same was true of People 'V. Ryan 11 and People 'V. Grant,1 8 in
which the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law of the state of New York
was the subject matter of linguistic scrutiny in order to determine
whether the administrative agency transcended the statutory authority.
The law prohibited the sale of beer, liquor, or wine on Sundays between three A.M. and noon. None of the statutory provisions dealt with
minors. However, the statute authorized the State Alcoholic Beverage
Control Board,
" ... to adopt rules and regulations and issue such orders for
the control and regulation of the manufacture, sale and distribution of liquors and wines, including ... the hours and days and
conditions of their sale, as will effectively ensure temperance in
the consumption of liquors and wines in the state and promote
obedience to law and order."
The statute further provided:
"Violation by any person of any rule of the state board shall
be a misdemeanor if such rule so provides and if such rule shall
be published in a manner prescribed by such board." 79
Upon this authority the board issued various rules. One of them prohibited the sale of liquors on Sundays until after two P.M. and declared
the violation a misdemeanor. Another rule prohibited the sale of beer
or wine to a minor actually or apparently under the age of sixteen
years. The violation of this rule was also declared a misdemeanor.
Ryan was indicted for the violation of the first mentioned and Grant
for that of the latter regulation. Both accused men attacked the validity
of the regulations for the reason, among others, that they were statu77 267 N.Y. 133, 195 N.E. 822 (1935), reversing 242 App. Div. 813, 275
N.Y.S. 630 (1934).
78
267 N.Y. 508, 196 N.E. 553 (1935), affirming 242 App. Div. 310, 275
N.Y.S. 74 (1934).
79
N.Y. Laws (1933), c.819, § 132-a (3) (e), c.180, § 197.
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tory ultra vires acts. Whereas in the Ryan case the New York Court
of Appeals declared the statute unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative power,8° the language of the Grant case suggests that the court
considered the regulations as being outside the statutory authority and
therefore invalid,s1. though it relied upon the authority of the Ryan
case.
The theory of the Supreme Court in United States v. Eaton and
of the state courts following it invokes strong criticism. If a general
authority in terms of a "necessary and proper clause" competes with
specific grants of power in a legislative act, should the specific grant of
power indeed prevail over the general grant upon the doctrine of
"expressio unius est exclusio alterius?" No doubt, the enumeration of
specific powers may express the wish of the legislature to limit the
powers to those enumerated in the act. But it also may mean a desire
of the legislature that at least the powers expressly provided in the
act shall be available to the administrative agency. The existence of a
general authority in form of a "necessary and proper clause" suggests
the latter interpretation. What would be the purpose of such a clause,
if the administrative agency cannot avail itself of it? The Constitution
of the United States also contains a "necessary and proper clause" 82
in addition to the specific grants of power conferred upon the federal
government.83 Though the authority granted in the Constitution is of
much greater importance and consequence than that of a statutory act,
it has always been held that the necessary and proper clause of the
Constitution bestows certain ( or rather uncertain) powers in addition
to those expressly enumerated.84
so Under reference to the broad power conferred by the statute the court said,
267 N.Y. at 137: "The attempt thus to commit to the unrestrained volition of an
administrative board so essentially a legislative function as the definition of a substantive criminal offense was quite obviously without effect."
s1. After having referred to the regulation providing that "no beer or wine shall
be sold to any minor, actually or apparently under the age of 16 years," "a violation of
the rule shall be a misdemeanor," the court said, 267 N.Y. 508: "There is nothing in
chapter 180 of the Laws of 1933 declaring such a sale unlawful."
82
U.S. Constitution, Art. 1, §8, cl. 18.
83
Id., cl. 1-17.
84
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 (1819); United States
v. Hall, 98 U.S. 343 (1878); Legal Tender Cases, IIO U.S. 421, 4 S. Ct. 122
(1884); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 12 S. Ct. 617 (1893); United States
v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 61 S. Ct. 1331 (1941); Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan
Corporation of Washington, D.C., 308 U.S. 21, 60 S. Ct. 15 (1939); and numerous
cases in connection with the power of the federal government to regulate interstate
commerce and with other federal powers.
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B. Power of Administrative Agencies to Create the Penalty of a
Criminal Offense
r. Power to Declare Whether the Violation of a Regulation
Shall be Punishable
While it seems to be established that a statute may delegate to an
administrative agency the power to determine the elements of a criminal offense if a sufficient primary standard exists, is the same true of
the other component of a criminal offense, i.e., of the penalty?
Suppose the statute leaves discretion to the administrative agency
to determine whether the violation of its rules and regulations shall be
punishable. This can be done either in the form of an affirmative discretion or in the form of the dispensing and suspending power. If the
draftsman of the statute chooses the latter method, the statute will be
upheld where there is a sufficiently definite primary standard for the
exercise of the discretion.85 Even an implied standard for the exercise
of the discretion might do. 86 If, however, the draftsman puts the discretion into the affirmative form, the statute will be invalidated.87
Thus, in Frend v. United States,88 a joint resolution of Congress prohibited display, within five hundred feet of an embassy, legation or
consulate in the District of Columbia, of any banner or other device
designed to bring any foreign government into public odium, or to
harass any diplomatic representative, except in accordance with a permit issued by the superintendent of police of the district. The accused
challenged the validity of the resolution on the ground that it unlawfully granted power to the superintendent to declare whether or not the
act condemned by the resolution should be punishable. But the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia sustained the resolution due
to the fact that the resolution itself declared certain elements to be a
crime and gave "merely" power to the superintendent to suspend the
operation of the resolution in a particular case. Though the resolution
did not indicate under what circumstances the superintendent may suspend the operation of the resolution by the issuance of a permit, the
court found "a definite standard for the exercise of the suspending
power" upon the purpose which the resolution was intended to serve.
85
Frend v. United States, (App. D.C. 1938) 100 F. (2d) 691. See also Davis
v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 17 S. Ct. 731 (1897). On the general subject of the
dispensing and suspending power as a matter of valid delegation of power, see 87
UNIV. PA. L. REV. 201 (1938); GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND COMMENTS 225-227 (1940).
,
86
Frend v. United States, (App. D.C. 1938) 100 F. (2d) 691.
87
People v. Grant, 242 App. Div. 310, 275 N.Y.S. 74 (1934), affd. by the
Court of Appeals on another ground in 267 N.Y. 508, 196 N.E. 553 (1935).
88
Frend v. United States, (App. D.C. 1938) 100 F. (2d) 691.
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The New York cases of Pepole v. Ryan 89 and People v. Grant 90
involved a statute which was phrased in the affirmative form providing
that "violation by any person of any rule of the state board shall be a
misdemeanor if such rule so prpvides...." Whereas the court of appeals in the Grant case condemned the statute as a statutory ultra vires
act,01 the lower court found it 'unconstitutional, because it delegated
power to the board to determine whether the violation of its rules
should be a criminal offense. The holding of the New York Appellate
Division in the Grant case seems to be in accordance with the dictum
in the Grimaud case. In that case, the Court expressly stated that the
administrative agency cannot determine whether a violation of a regulation shall be punishable. Said the Court:
" ... The Secretary did not exercise the legislative power of
declaring the penalty or :fixing the punishment for grazing sheep
without a permit, but the punishment is imposed by the act itself." 92
The Frend case is easity distinguishable from the Grant case on account
of the form in which the discretion of the administrative agency was
put by the statute: in the Grant case, it was affirmative discretion, and
in the Frend case, it was suspending po~ei;. However, substance should
prevail over form, or in the words of Justice Miller: 93
"In whatever language a statute may be framed, its purpose
must be determined by its natural and reasonable effect."
~

There seem to be other distinctions between the cases. In the Frend
case, the power was conferred upon a municipal agency, whereas in the
Grant case it was given to a state agency. Furthermore, in the Frend
case, there was a definite standard for the determination of the agency,
or at least the. court found so, whereas in the Grant case there was no
standard whatsoever upon which the determination of the agency depended. It was entirely free in deciding whether a violation of its rules
should be punishable.
The fact that the statute provides for the maximum penalty in the
event that the administrative agency declares the violation of its rules
punishable seems to ,be of no importance. In the California case of
89
267 N.Y. 133, 195 N. E. 822 (1935), reversing 242 App. Div. 813, 275
N.Y.S. 630 (1934).
90
267 N.Y. 508, 196 N. E. 553 (1935), affirming 242 App. Div. 310, 275
N.Y.S. 74 (1934).
,
91
See supra, at note 81.
92
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 at 523, 31 S. Ct. 480 (1910).
98
Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 at 268 (1875). See also
Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 at 443, 61 S. Ct. 246 (1940).
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Gilbert v. Stoc~ton Port District,94 the defendant was indicted under
a statute which conferred power upon the Stockton Port District "to
prescribe :fines, forfeitures and penalties for the violation of any provision of any ordinance, but no penalty shall exceed $ 500.00, or six
months imprisonment, or both." The court declared the statute invalid
upon the authority of In re W erner,95 where Justice McFarland, concurring, stated that "The Constitution does not contemplate that the
state should be overrun and overloaded with innumerable legislative
bodies, each having power to make laws under which citizens may be
sent to jail." And in Board of Harbor Commissioners v. Excelsior
Redwood Co.,96 the court clearly said that :fixing the maximum of the
penalty does not cure the invalid delegation:
"The act of the legislature in fixing the maximum of such
penalty is of no avail; the vice of the whole matter is in not itself
fixing of the penalty, and in delegating such legislative power to
the plaintiff."
Consequently, it seems that power cannot be delegated to an administrative agency to determine freely whether the violation of its rules
shall be punishable, though it might be admissible to reach the same
effect by use of the suspending power.

Power of Municipal Corporations to Declare Whether the
Violation of an Ordinance shall be Punishable
It is not a novelty that delegation to municipal corporations may
be broader than to administrative agencies, whatever the reason therefor may be. 97 Consequently, it is not surprising that municipal corpora2.

94

7 Cal. (2d) 384, 60 P. (2d) 847 (1936).
129 Cal. 567, 62 P. 97 (1900).
96
88 Cal. 491 at 493, 26 P. 375 (1891).
97
Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S. 141, 9 S. Ct. 256 (1888); State v. Noyes,
30 N.H. 279 (1855). See also W1LL1s, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 137-138 (1936);
GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw, CASES AND COMMENTS 207-209 (1940). On tlJ.e
reasons why municipal corporations may exercise a power broader than administrative
agencies there is a split of opinion. The following theories have been advanced: ( 1)
municipal corporations have an inherent right of self-government, so that no legislative
act is necessary to confer that broad power upon them. See Eaton, "The Right to
Local Self-Government," 13 HARV. L. REv. 441, 570, 638 (1900); 14 id. 20, u6
(1900); I McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATioNs, 2d rev. ed., §§ 68, 91, 185,
188 (1940); (2) municipal corporations derive their power from delegation of power
by the legislature, but the legislature may delegate to them even legislative functions.
This is justifiable upon (a) "immemorial practice," Fox v. McDonald, IOI Ala. 51,
13 So. 416 (1892); (b) "expediency amounting almost to necessity," Brodbine v.
Revere, 182 Mass. 598, 66 N.E. 607 (1903); (c) "necessity," GELLHORN, supra,
209 (1940).
95
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tions have even an implied power to provide for the .enforcement of
their ordinances by reasonable and proper fines. 98 The implication is
based upon the fact that an ordinance without a penalty would be nugatory. 99 However, in order to punish the violation of an ordinance with
forfeiture, express power must be given to the municipal corporation,
either by the charter or by state law.100 ,Express power must also be
conferred upon the municipal corporation where it creates a penalty for
an offense against the state as distinguished from a murticipal offense.101
This limitation of implied power of creating penalties is due to the fact
that it refers only to the local and internal affairs of the municipality.102
· What fines are proper and reasonable so that they can be created
even without express grant by the legislature for the violation of an
ordi11-ance depends upon the nature of the offense and the circumstances.103 The penalty by imprisonment cannot be inflicted, unless the
power is expressly given to the municipal corporation.104
Due to the special treatment of municipal corporations, it is clear
98
Goldsmith v. Huntsville, 120 Ala. 182, 24 So. 509 (1898); Mobile v. Yuille,
3 Ala. 137 (1841); Chambers v. Barnesville, 89 Ga. 739, 15 S.E. 634 (1892);
Korah v. Ottawa, 32 Ill. 121 (1863); Detroit v. Fort Wayne & B. I. Ry., 95 Mich.
456, 54 N.W. 958 (1893); Bellerive Inv. Co. v. Kansas City, 321 Mo. 969, 13 S.W.
(2d) 628 (1929); Fisher v. Harrisburg, 2 Grant Cas. (Pa.) 291 (1854); Trigally
v. Memphis, 6 Coldw. (46 Tenn.) 382 (1869); Winooski v. Gokey, 49 Vt. 282
(1877). See also 2 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CoRPORATioNs, 5th ed., § 6ro, p. 952
(19n).
99
Winooski v. Gokey, 49 Vt. 282 (1877).
100 Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 137 (1841); New Hamptc:m v. Conroy, 56 Iowa
498, 9 N.W. 417 (1881); Varden v. Mount, 78 Ky. 86 (1879); Taylor v. Carondelet, 22 Mo. 105 (1856); New York v. Ordrenan, 12 Johns. (N.Y.) 122 (1815);
Kneedler v. Norristown, 100 Pa. St. 368 (1882). See also 3 McQuILLIN, MUNICIPAL
CoRPORATioNs, 2d ed., § 923, p. 32 (1928); 2 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONs,
5th ed., § 617, p. 956 (19n).
101 3 McQuILLIN, MUNICIPAL CoRPORATioNs, 2d ed., § 923, p. 32 (1928),
and cases cited there; 2 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS, 5th ed., § 630, p. 965
( 19 II). A difficult situation arises where an offense is a state offense and a municipal
offense as well, so that it may be punished eventually under state and municipal law.
On this problem see 3 McQUILLIN, id., § 924, p. 34 (1928); 2 DILLON, id., § 632,
p. 967.
102 3 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CoRPORATioNs, 2d ed., § 923, p. 33 (1928).
103 Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 137 (1841) (a penalty, although small, fixed on
every stroke of the hammer which an unauthorized person uses in his trade of a goldsmith, is unreasonable); New York v. Ordrenan, 12 Johns. (N.Y.) 122 (1815).
104 Dodd v. Peak, (App. D.C. 1931) 47 F. (2d) 430; Ex parte Montgomery,
64 Ala. 463 (1879); Ex parte Slattery, 3 Ark. 484 (1841); Ex parte Green, 94 Cal.
387, 29 P. 783 (1892); Kinmundy v. Mahan, 72 Ill. 462 (1874); Low v. Evans,
16 Ind. 486 (1861); Burlington v. Kellar, 18 Iowa 59 (1864); State ex rel. Schroeder.
v. Baton Rouge, 40 La. Ann. 209, 3 So. 541 (1888); Bozemann v. Merrill, 81 Mont.
19, 261 P. 876 (1927); Brown v. Jarvis, 36 Wyo. 406, 256 P. 336 (1927). See
also 2 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS, 2d rev. ed., § 752, p. 848 (1939).
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that authorities in this field cannot be used as a general proposition of
administrative law. Thus, in Smallwood v. District of Columbia,105 a
Congressional statute was sustained which authorized the Director of
Traffic:
" ... to prescribe within the limitations of this act reasonable
penalties of fine, or imprisonment not to exceed ten days in lieu of
or in addition to any fine, for the violation of any such regulation."
The court was aware of the fact that the case presented a special
situation, since the power was given to an official of the District of
Columbia and since the District of Columbia is regarded as "a body
corporate for municipal purposes." 106 In fact, the court decided the
case by reference to Smithson v. District of Columbia,1° 7 where the same
issue had been decided by reference to Dillon's Treatise on Municipal

Corporations.
The different treatment of municipal corporations from that of
administrative agencies is usually justifiable on the ground that municipal agencies are more familiar with local affairs than federal or
even state agencies. However, where such a familiarity is of no importance, it seems entirely legitimate to raise the question why there
should be a difference between the law of municipal corporations and
that of general administrative law.108

3. Power to Prescribe a Penalty for the Violation of Their
Rules and Regulations
Assuming that a. statute clearly declares an act punishable, but
delegates to an administrative agency the power to determine the particular penalty for the violation of its rules, is it valid? 100
The statute may or may not provide for the maximum penalty.
Where the statute prescribes the maximum of the penalty which the
agency may fix for the violation of its rules and regulations, leaving
105

57 App. D.C. 58, 17 F. (2d) 210 (1927). See also People on Complaint of
Jones v. Sagat, 204 App. Div. 485, 198 N.Y.S. 449 (1923).
106
Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S. 141, 9 S. Ct. 256 (1888); Barnes v.
District of Columbia, 91 U.S. 540 (1875). See also l McQmLLIN, MUNICIPAL
CoRPORATIONs, 2d rev. ed., § 134, p. 401 (1940).
107
42 App. D.C. 184, 92 F. (2d) 549 (1914).
108
Foster, "The Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Officers," 7
ILL. L. REv. 397 at 398 (1913); GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw, CASES AND CoMMENTS 209 (1940), citing Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364, 79 N.E. 745 (1907),
affd. 214 U.S. 91, 29 S. Ct. 567 (1909).
100
Hyneman, "Administrative Adjudication: An Analysis," 5 I PoL. Sci. Q.
383, 516 (1936); Brown, "Administrative Commissions and the Judicial Power," 19
MINN. L. REV. ·261 at 293-295 (1935).
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the particular penalty ,to the agency might be desirable. It is established
that the penalty of a criminal offense must have a substantial relationship to its elements.110 The legislature is not in a position to. recognize
that re!ationship if the elements of the criminal offense are finally
created by the administrative agency in the form of rules and regulations. But the fixing of a pfimary standard by the legislature does
enable it to provide for a maximum penalty. On the other hand, in
fixing the penalty it seems that the agency has no guide except the
degree to which a particular regulation is important for the carrying
out of the legislative policy.
There is little law on the problem. In Zuber v. So'uthern Railroad,111 the Georgia court took a firm stand for the validity of a statute
prescribing a maximum penalty.112 It also ·explained elaborately its desirability with these words:
"As to some subjects it might be easy for the legislature not
only to declare that a delinquency should be redressed by civil or
criminal penalty, but also for it justly to,assess and fix upon the
exact amount of the penalty, or at least to set certain limits. As
to other subjects, the determination of the amount of the penalty
or of the basis on which it justly should be laid may involve such
an amount of investigation and a consideration of so many particular exigencies as to make the fixing of the amount of the penalty only quasi-legislative and predominantly administrative in
character ... and it may readily be seen that the fixing of a just
penalty for a violation of the rule in question is a subject which
the commission might very naturally have dealt with by entering
into the field of particularization and classification. For instance
, ... it [ the commission] IJ1ight have said that the penalty for failing to furnish fruit cars should be $4 per day, sand cars $I per
day, and so on, or that the roads of one class should pay one penalty for delinquency, and that the roads of another class differently
situated should pay a different amount." 118
0

110
Ex parte Page, 19 Cal. App. (2d) I, 298 P. 178 (1931) hearing dismissed,
214 Cal. 350, 5 P. (2d) 605 (1931); In re Palmer, 19 Cal. App. (2d) 5, 298 P.
179 (1931)-;hearing dismissed, 214 Cal. 792, 5 P. (2d) 608 (1931).
111
9 'Ga. App. 539, 71 S.E. 937 (19II).
112
"The legislature may authorize an administrative body or officer to make
regulations and may declare it to be punishable for any person to violate those regulations; but, 'unless the legislature itself gives its sanction, at least in general terms, to
the imposition of punishment, or of civil redress in the nature of punishment, for an
act or general class of acts, no merely administrative board can provide for the punishment of that act or class of acts and supply the details of how and when the penalty or
punishment shall be imposed." 9 Ga. App. at 545.
118
9 Ga. App. at 546-547.
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'!'.he opinion of the Georgia court on the permissibility and desirability of a statute which confers power on an administrative agency
to fix the penalty for the violation of its rules and regulations up to a
maximum penalty is merely dictum. In making this dictum, the court
is aware that it would be "somewhat of an extension of the doctrine so
ably set forth by' Mr. Justice Lamar in the Grimaud case, but it is an
extension which may be justified by the nature of the subject matter
of the penalty." 114
A simpler situation arises if the statute confers power upon the
administrative agency to fix a penalty for the violation of its rules and
regulations without providing for a maximum penalty. Such a statute
would not be valid even under the Zuber case. Furthermore, a penalty
is essential to the creation of any statutory crime.115
4. Distinction between Penal and Civil Sanctions
Due to the fact that the legislature may not delegate to an administrative agency the power to create a penal sanction for the violation
of its regulations, but may authorize it to prescribe a civil sanction such
as compensation, it becomes important to determine when a sanction is
penal and when civil in its nature.116
In a group of cases,111 statutes conferred power upon a commission
to issue regulations concerning the storage, wharfage, demurrage, and
so forth, and to fix a "penalty" within a certain maximum amount for
iu Id. at 546.
It has been held that denouncement of an act or acts necessary to constitute
a crime do not make the commission of such act or acts a crime unless a punishment
is annexed, for punishment is necessary to constitute a crime as its exact definition.
United States v. Seibert, (D.C. W.Va. 1924) 2 F. (2d) 80; Holmes v. United States,
(C.C.A. 5th, 1920) 267 F. 529; certiorari denied 254 U.S. 640, 41 S. Ct. 13
(1920); Johnston v. State, 100 Ala. 32, 14 So. 629 (1893); State v. Schoepf, 5 Ohio
N.P. (N.S.) 161 (1907); Horak v. State, 95 Tex. Cr. 474, 255 S.W. 191 (1923);
Hannabass v. Maryland Casualty Co., 169 Va. 559, 194 S.E. 808 (1938); State v.
Truax, 130 Wash. 69, 226 P. 259 (1924). On the other hand, where a statute
prohibits a matter of public grievance or commands a matter of public convenience,
although no penalty is prescribed for disobeying its prohibitions or commands, an
indictment will be sustained and the offense punished by a fine. State v. Deer, 80
Wash. 92, 141 P. 321 (1914).
116
This approach is rejected by Cheadle, "The Delegation of Legislative Functions," 27 YALE L.J. 892 at 917-919 (1918). Cheadle takes the view that creation
of a civil sanction is as much a legislative function as creating a penal sanction. See
also, Brown, "Administrative Commissions and the Judicial Power," 19 MINN. L.
REv. 261 at 293-295 (1935).
117
See Cheadle, "The Delegation of Legislative Functions," 2 7 YALE L.J. 8 92
at 917 (1918); Brown, "Administrative Commissions and the Judicial Power," 19
MINN. L. REv. 261 at 293-295 (1935); Hyneman, "AdJDinistrative Adjudication:
An Analysis," 51 Pou. Sci. Q. 383, 516 (1936).
115
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the violation of such regulations. The penalty had to be paid to the
shipper by the carrier responsible. In the Florida case of State v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry.,118 the shipper violated a demurrage rule and
thereby incurred the morretary "penalty" fixed by the commission for
the violation of the rule. When the shipper refused to pay it, the commission imposed another penalty and brought suit to enforce it. The
action was dismissed, because the statute did not provide for such a
second penalty. The court found that the first "penalty" was in fact
not a penalty, but a monetary liability of a civil character, and that it
. therefore was strange on the part of the commission to enforce a monetary liability by a real penalty. That the sanction for the violation of
the demurrage rule was a civil rather than a penal sanction was derived
from the fact that the violation of the rule did not directly a:ffect the
public, that the liability incurred was not subject to the pardoning
power and that the statute or rule gave only a private right to one
person against another.
In the Georgia case of Southern Railway v. Melton, 119 the defendant had violated a rule which was issued by the Railroad Commission of Georgia and had fixed a reasonable charge for the delay in
furnishing cars. Upon suit for payment, the defendant contended that
the statute conferred upon the Railroad Commission of Georgia the
power to fix a penalty and that the statute was invalid. Again, the
court found that the liability incurred by the violation of the rule was
of civil rather than of penal nature, since the liability was not enforceable by the state, but by a private person. In the Mississippi case of
Keystone Lumber Yard 'U. Yazoo & M. V. R. R.,120 the court arrived
at the same conclusion. The liability incurred by the violation of the
Mississippi demurrage rule was characterized as a civil compensation
rather than a penalty, and in State ex rel. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R.
v. Public Service Commission,1 21 the court referred to the Melton, Atlantic Coast Line and Keystone Lumber Yard cases, adding that the
use of the word "penalty" in the statute is of no concern in determining
its real nature.
'
The problem whether a liability is penal or civil is not a novelty.
It has arisen in various fields of law.122 In administrative law, neither
118

56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969 (1908).
133 Ga. 277, 65 S.E. 665 (1909).
120
97 Miss. 433, 53 So. 8 (1910).
121
94 Wash. 274, 162 P. 523 (1917).
122 Whether a sanction is penal is important in conjunction with: (a) The full
faith and credit clause of the Constitution. See Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657,
13 S. Ct. 224 ( I 892). (b) The ex post facto clause of the Constitution. See Calder
v. Bull, 3 Dall, (3 U.S.) 386 (1798). (c) Contempt of court. If ·a contempt is
119
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the denial nor the revocation of a license has been considered a penalty.123 It has also been said that the back pay under the National Labor
Relations Act must not be regarded as punitive and that, therefore, a
deduction should be allowed of that amount which the striker has or
could have earned during the period o~ the strike.124 It seems, however,
that even though these deductions would not be allowed, the back pay
would still not be a penalty, since it is a private right on the part of
the employee against the employer though enforced by the National
Labor Relations Board. In the Wisconsin case of Klein v. Barry,125 a
statute was involved which conferred power upon the state security
commission to declare sales of securities voidable in the event they
were issued in violation of the Blue Sky Law or in discord with the
representations made to the commission or with its requirements. The
court declared the statute invalid on the ground that "Under this act
the corporation or person might be penalized or punished at the will
of the Commission." 126 Publicity may be an administrative or a penal
sanction.121

C. Power to Choose a Penal Sanction out of Several Sanctions
(Choice of Sanctions}
In numerous instances, statutes provide for several sanctions for
the enforcement of the rules and regulations of administrative agencriminal, the President may exercise his pardoning power. Ex parte Grossman, 267
U.S. 87, 45 S. Ct. 332 (1925). (d) Equity jurisdiction. It has been held not to be
permissible to enjoin a person from committing a crime, since prosecution of it constitutes an adequate remedy and the accused cannot be deprived of his right to a trial
by jury. Attorney General v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 371 (1817);
People v. Prouty, 262 Ill. 218, 104 N.E. 387 (1914). See, however, Featherstone v.
Independent Service Station Assn. of Texas, (Tex. Civ. App. 1928), IO S.W. (2d)
124, commented upon in 42 HARV. L. REv. 693 (1928), 7 TEX. L. REV. 638 (1929)
and noted in 27 M1cH. L. REv. 833 (1929).
123 Mandel v. Board of Regents, 250 N.Y. 173, 164 N.E. 895 (1928), affirming
224 App. Div. 772, 230 N.Y.S. 870 (1928).
1
u Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197,
59 S. Ct. 206 (1938); N.L.R.B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 59
S. Ct. 490 (1939); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177 at 198, 61 S.
Ct. 845 (1941) ("Since only actual losses should be made good, it seems fair that
deductions should be made not only for actual earnings by the worker but also for
losses which he wilfully incurred"). See also N.L.R.B. v. J. Greenebaum Tanning
Co., (C.C.A. 7th, 1940) no F. (2d) 984; N.L.R.B. v. Leviton Mfg. Co., (C.C.A.
2d, 1940) I I I F (2d) 619; BUFFORD, THE WAGNER AcT, § 415 (1941).
125 Klein v. Barry, 182 Wis. 255, 196 N.W. 457 (1923). See also 42 CoL. L.
REV. 472 (1942).
126 182 Wis. at 274.
127 GrnsBURG, PUBLICITY AS A SANCTION IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAw: A Bw STicK
OF LrrTLE FAME 330 (thesis submitted at Harvard Law School 1941).
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cies.128 The agency has the choice of employing them alternatively or
cumulatively.129 Where one of these sanctions is penal, can it be said
that the administrative agency has the power to determine whether the
violation· of a rule or regulation shall be a crime? In United States v.
Bioff,130 and Nick v. United States,131 the federal courts had to decide
whether the Antiracketeerin~ Act was invalid in so far as it provides:
"Prosecutions under Sections 420a to 42oe of this title shall
be commenced only upon the express direction of the Attorney
General of the United States." 132
,
It was contended that the statute attempted to delegate to the Attorney General the power to define and determine what acts shall constitute a. crime and be punishable. In both cases, the courts held that
the punishability was created by the act and not by the Attorney General. It was further said that the fact that the consent of the Attorney
General to the prosecution was made a condition precedent purported
merely to increase the safeguards for an unjustifiable trial. He has not
discretion to determine whether an act shall be punishable, but whether
a punishable act shall be prosecuted. Said the court in the Bio ff case: 133
"The line of division between permitted and prohibited delegations of legislative powers has not yet been adequately surveyed by the few decisions which deal with the problem ....
"It is to be noted that in the case at bar the crime is fully and
adequately defined in the statute. The punishable action is clearly
identified. What is left open to the Attorney General's discretion
is whether a prosecution shall commence. In that respect it di:ffers
from the cited instances where either law making or regulation
making power is conferred upon an administrative agency, operative in futuro. No such authority is conferred by the statute
under consideration.
"The Attorney General is given the limited choice of proceeding or forbearing in any particular instance after the event."
The Bioff and Ni;k cases seem to be applicable to the problem of
choice of' sanctions, one of which is of penal nature. In having the
128 On "choice of sanctions," see Monographs on Civil Aeronautics Authority, p.
43, and Security and Exchange Commission, p. 8 (criteria for choice of sanctions),
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES: MONOGRAPHS OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S. Doc. 10,
77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941}, pts. 6, 13.
•
129
ld., Securities and Exchange Commission Monograph, p. 8.
130
(D.C. N.Y. 1941) 40 F. Supp. 497•
131
(C.C.A. 8th, 1941) 122 F. (2d) 660.
132
48 Stat. L. 979 (1934), 18 U.S.C. (1940), § 420c.
133
40 F. Supp. at 498.
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choice of sanctions, the administrative agency does not determine
whether an act shall be a criminal offense. It merely has discretion to
decide whether a prosecution shall be commenced.

II
PowER OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES TO IMPOSE PENALTIES

A. Inflexible Penalties
Whether an administrative agency may impose the penal sanction
upon a delinquent is one of the most serious problems in administrative
law. If the penalty which the statute provides is inflexible, the imposition of this penalty results in nothing but a finding of facts. A finding
of facts has always been considered as an administrative function. 184
Consequently, it seems that the administrative agency may impose an
inflexible penalty. Of course, the constitutional requirements of trial
by jury and due process have to be complied with.185 In many instances,
trial by jury can be dispensed with by federal agencies, since the con5titutional provision of trial by jury does not apply to "petty" offenses.186
The Supreme Court of the United States has approved of the
imposition of inflexible penalties by administrative agencies. In the
m Bartlet v. Kane, 16 How. (57 U.S.) 263 (1853); Arrow Stevedore Co. v.
Pillsbury, (C.C.A. 9th, 1937) 88 F. (2d) 446; Index Mines Corp. v. Industrial
Commission, 82 Colo. 272, 259 P. 1036 (1927). Cf. Milwaukee Corrugating Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 187 Wis. 414, 222 N.W. 251 (1928).
135 Passavant v. United States, 148 U.S. 214 at 222, 13 S. Ct. 572 (·1892)
stated "They [defendants] had full notice of the proceedings before the board of
general appraisers upon their appeal to said board, and ample opportunity to be heard
on the question of the market value of the imported goods." See, however, Oceanic
Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 329 at 340-343, 29 S. Ct. 671 (1909),
holding that the party fined had no right under the statute or due process to a hearing.
In Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 53 S. Ct. 167 (1932), the
Supreme Court modified Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, supra, to the extent
of saying that the statute, as interpreted by administrative practice, contemplated an
administrative hearing and a fair determination of the evidence, and that the conclusion of the administrative agency as to the evidence was final. See "Report of the
Special Committee on Administrative Law," 61 A.B.A. REP. 721 at 747 (1936),
reprinted in 4 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 423 at 448-449 (1938);
80 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 96 (1931).
136
Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 24 S. Ct. 826 (1904). Se_e also Frankfurter and Corcoran, "Petty Federal Offense and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial
by Jury," 39 HARV. L. REv. 917 (1926). Whether trial by jury is required in the
states depends on state law. Due process of law under state constitutions does not
prevent a state from abolishing jury trial in trial of serious offenses. Williams v. Hert,
(C.C.Ind. 1901) 110 E. 166. Ex parte Brown, (D.C. N.C. 1905) 140 F. 461.
Due process under the federal Constitution does not require the states to provide for
trial by jury in case of petty offenses. Natal v. Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621, II S. Ct.
636 (1891).
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first cases in which the Supreme Court dealt with the problem, a penalty was imposed by custom officials for the undervaluation of goods
imported into the United States. The penalty consisted of an additional duty of a certain percentage on the actual value of the goods.
As early as I853, the Supreme Court, in Bartlet v. Kane,181 held the
imposition of the penalty by a custom official valid. In Pas-savant v.
United States,1 38 the Court regarded the additional penalty as "a legal
incident to the finding of a dutiable value in excess of the entry value
to the extent provided by the statute." Origet v. Hedden 139 was decided by reference to Passavant v. United States. In Oceanic Steam
Navigation Co. v. Stranahan,140 and Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting,141
the Supreme Court pronounced the same ruling for the field of immigration. In the Oceanic Navigation case, the defendant was punished
by the Secretary of Commerce and Labor for the violation of the Alien
Immigration Act of March 3, I903,142 with the penalty provided in the
act. The act declares that a person or transportation company who
brings to the United States an alien afflicted with a loathsome or with
a dangerous contagious disease shall pay to the Collector of Customs
the sum of $ I oo for each and every violation of the provisions. The
delinquent attacked the statute for the reason, among others, that it
did not provide for a judicial procedure. The Court distinguished the
case from the Wong Wing case on the ground that a flexible pev.alty
was involved and held the statute valid upon the precedents of Bartlet
v. Kane, Passavant v. United States., and Origet v. Hedden. The case
of Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v: Elting also involved the imposition of an
inflexible penalty by the Collector of Customs for bringing aliens to
the United States who were affiicted with certain diseases. Again, the
contention was made that the imposition of the penalty without a judicial prncedure was invalid. This contention was rejected by reference
to the Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. case, where the Court had considered the same argument unfounded. The imposition of an inflexible
penalty by an administrative agency is permissible not only in the fields
of tariff, internal revenue and taxation, but also in other subjects.143
137

16 How. (57 U.S.) 263 (1853).
148 U.S. 214 at 222, 13 S. Ct. 572 (1892).
139
155 U.S. 228, 15 S. Ct. 92 (1894).
140
214 U.S. 320, 29 S. Ct. 671 (1909).
141
287 U.S. 329, 53 S. Ct. 167 (1932).
142
Alien Immigration Act, 32 Stat. L. 1213, c. 1012 (1903).
143
In Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S: 320 at 339, 29 S. Ct.
671 (1909), the Supreme Court said: "In accord with this settled judicial construction
the legislation of Congress from the beginning, not only as to tariff but as to internal
revenue, taxation and other subjects, has proceeded on the conception that it was
138
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B. Flexible Penalties
The imposition of a flexible penalty by an administrative agency
requires not only a finding of facts but also a finding of the proper and
adequate remedy. It is true that the finding of a penalty by an administrative officer is not something that is foreign to the field of admihistrative law. It is established that an administrative officer may
exercise the power to pardon or to remit a penalty.144 However, the
exercise of this power can result only in an advantage and not in a disadvantage for the individual, whereas the finding of a penalty leaves
discretion to the administrative agency in either direction. A recognized
power which comes closest to the imposition of a flexible penalty by an
administrative agency is that of an officer to determine the concrete
penalty which an indeterminate sentence has imposed upon the accused.145 Once it is admitted that an administrative agency may establish the guilt of an accused as a matter of finding of facts, there is not
much difference between an officer who determines the final penalty of
an indeterminate sentence and an administrative agency which imposes
a flexible penalty, except that the scope of discretion might be narrower
in the first case than in the latter.
There is little doubt, however, that the Supreme Court of the
within the competency of Congress, when legislating as to matters exclusively within
its control, to impose appropriate obligations and sanction their enforcement by reasonable money penalties, giving to executive officers the power to enforce such penalties
without the necessity of invoking the judicial power." See also Brown, "Administrative
Commissions and the Judicial Power," 19 MINN. L. REv. 261 (1935).
44
1.
In most states the pardoning power is in the governor, who is to exercise
it with the advice of his counsel or other officers designated for the purpose or alone,
but a statute giving a board authority to pardon or parole does not grant judicial power,
nor delegate legislative authority. Woods v. State, 130 Tenn. 100, 169 S.W. 558
(1914). See also I BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAw, 9th ed., § 899, p. 644 (1923); l
WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAw, 12th ed., § 44, p. 62 (1932); JENSEN, THE PARDONING
PowER IN THE AMERICAN STATES (19.22); 8 NEW YoRK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION COMMITTEE, PROBLEMS RELATING TO EXECUTIVE ADMINISTRATION AND
PowERS 22-25, 63-79 (1938). Also, see 3 U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S SURVEY OF
RELEASE PROCEDURES, c. 9 (1939); Weihofen, "The Effect of a Pardon," 88 UNIV.
PA. L. REV. 177 (1939); Weihofen, "Legislative Pardons," 27 CAL. L. REv. 371
(1939); Radin, "Legislative Pardons: Another View," id. 387 (1939); 5 FoRD. L.
REV. 166 (1936).
145
Cohn v. Ketchum, 123 W. Va. 534, 17 S.E. (2d) 43 (1941). See also
Johnson v. State, 169 Ga. 814, 152 S.E. 76 (1929); State v. Duff, 144 Iowa 142,
122 N.W. 829 (1909); State v. Stephenson, 69 Kan. 405, 76 P. 905 (1904); Mutart
v. Pratt, 51 Utah 246, 170 P. 67 (1917); State v. Dugan, 84 N.J.L. 603, 89 A. 691
(1913); Miller v. State, 149 Ind. 607, 49 N.E. 894 (1898); In re Marlow, 75
N.J.L. 400, 68 A. 171 (1907); State v. Mulcare, 189 Wash. 625, 66 P. (2d) 360
(1937). For an elaborate discussion of the purpose of the "indeterminate sentence"
law, see Ware v. Sanders, 146 Iowa 233, 124 N.W. 1081 (1910).
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United States, in the Wong Wing case,146 declared the imposition of a
flexible penalty by an administrative agency unconstitutional. In this
case, the Commissioner of Immigration found that Wong Wing and
others were unlawfully within the United States and not entitled to
remain. He adjudged that they be imprisoned at hard labor and afterwards removed from the United States. Upon a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, the Supreme Court condemned the imposition of the
penalty without a judicial trial and said:
" ... It is not consistent with the theory of our government
that the legislature should, after having defined an offense as an
infamous crime, find the facts of guilt and adjudge the punishment by one of its own agents." 147
The Wong Wing case raises the question to what extent an administrative agency is prohibited from imposing a flexible penalty without
judicial trial. The language of the opinion, as quoted above, suggests
that t~e prohibition is limited to the imposition of a flexible penalty
for an "infamous crime." 148 This suggestion seems to be corroborated
by a dictum in the Oceanic Steam Navigation case, where the Court
conceded that it is
" ... within the competency of Congress, when legislating as to
matters exclusively within its control, to impose appropriate obligations and sanction their enforcement by reasonable money
penalties, giving to executive officers the power to enforce such
penalties without the necessity of invoking the judicial power." 149
146
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 16 S. Ct. 977 (1895). See
Brown, "Administrative Commissions and Judicial Power," 19 M1NN. L. REv. 261
(1935).
147
163 U.S. at 237.
148 There is a split of opinion_ on the question what the test is for the determination of an infamous crime. The old test was the character of the crime rather than
the nature of the punishment. The modern view, however, is that the question is
determined by the nature of the punishment, and not by the character of the crime,
and that any crime is infamous that is punishable by death or by imprisonment, with
or without hard labor, in a state prison, or by the loss of civil or political privileges.
See United States v. Smith, (C.C. Va. 1889) 40 F. 755; United States v. Johannesen,
(C.C. Ga. 1888) 35 F. 41 I ; People v. Toynbee, 20 Barb, 168, I I How. Pr. 289, 2
Park Cr. 329 (N.Y. 1855), affd. Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 12 How. Pr.
238, 2 Park. Cr. 421, 490 (1856); Baum v. State, 157 Ind. 282, 61 N.E. 672
( I 901). The determination turns not on the punishment actually inflicted but upon
the punishment which the court is authorized to impose. See United States v. Carrollo,
. (D.C. Mo. 1939) 30 F. Supp. 3; State ex rel. Anderson v. Fousek, 91 ,Mont. 448,
8 P. (2d) 791 (1932); In re Dunham's Estate, 181 Okla. 40_7, 74 P. (2d) 117
(1937).
149
Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 at 339, 29 S. Ct.
671 (1909).
'
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However, the case of Lipke v. Lederer 150 has given rise to doubt
whether an administrative agency may impose a :flexible penalty even
within the limitations of the Wong Wing and Oceanic Steam Navigation ·cases. In the Lipke case, the Collector of Internal Revenue imposed upon Lipke a penalty tax for the nonpayment of the regular tax
and threatened collection of the tax and penalty by seizure and sale of
property. Lipke petitioned for a restraining order. Under section 3224
of the Revised Statutes, the Court did not have jurisdiction, if the
assessment or collection of a tax and not that of a penalty was involved.
However, it was found that the assessment was in fact an imposition of
a penalty so that jurisdiction existed. Assuming jurisdiction, the Court
had to determine the question whether the imposition of the penalty
was consistent with due process of law. This question was answered in
the negative, the Court saying:
" ... And certainly we cannot conclude, in the absence of language admitting of no other construction, that Congress intended
that penalties for crime should be enforced through the secret
findings and summary action of executive officers. The guarantees
of due process of law and trial by jury are not to be forgotten or
disregarded." 151
Since this statement was necessary for the final determination of the
petition, it was not merely dictum, but holding.152 Did this holding
overrule the Wong Wing and Oceanic Steam Navigation cases, as far
as these cases permitted the imposition of a :flexible penalty by an administrative agency? This seems to depend upon whether the Court
condemned the "secret finding and summary action" rather than the
fact that it was done by "executive officers."
The case of Regal Drug Corp. v. Wardell 153 does not throw any
light on the problem. Here the Collector of Internal Revenue levied
a penal tax for the withdrawal of distilled liquor from bonded warehouses after the revocation of the liquor license. He further imposed
various other penalties without notice and hearing in order to satisfy
the assessment of the taxes and penalties. The order to refrain from
enforcing the collection of the taxes and penalties was granted by reference to the Lipke and Lederer cases without any further elaboration.
150

161
152

(I

259 U.S. 557, 42 S. Ct. 549 (1921).
259 U.S. at 562.
Cf.
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940), suggesting that it was dictum.
153
260 U.S. 386, 43 S. Ct. 152 (1922).
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The majority of the lower federal courts,154 as well as the Utah
Supreme Court,155 took a stand against the imposition of any flexible
penalty by administrative agencies.
The problem is of eminent importance. Due to the fact that administrative boards and tribunals have been held to lack the power to
punish for contempt, even if conferred by legislative act,156 statutes
have been passed which declare contempt of boards a criminal offense 157
and confer power upon the agency itself to impose the penalty.158 But
even more important is the fact that, in general, courts are today
swamped with great floods of cases which they were never designed to
handle and the machinery breaks under the strain. In Massachusetts,
for instance, almost a third of the total number of lower courts and
154
Dukich v. Blair, (D.C. Wash. 1925) 3 F. (2d) 302; Jasper v. Hellmich,
(D.C. Mo. 1925) 4 F. (2d) 852. Contra: Seligman v. Bowers, (D.C. N.Y. 1925)
4 F. (2d) IOI I.
155
Tite v. State Tax Commission, 89 Utah 404, 57 P. (2d) 734 (1936). See
GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND COMMENTS 446, 447 (1940).
1 6
~ lnterstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 14 S. Ct. n25
(1892); Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 2II U.S. 407, 29 S. Ct. n5
(1908); Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 44
S. Ct. 336 (1924); People v. Swena, 88 Colo. 337, 296 P. 271 (1931); Langenberg
v. Decker, 131 Ind. 471, 31 N.E. 190 (1892); Roberts v. Hackney, 109 Ky. 265, 58
S.W. 810, 59 S.W. 328 (1900). See also 35 CoL. L. REv. 578 (1935); 37 HARv. L.
REv. 747 (1924); Lilienthal, "The Power of Governmental Agencies to Compel Testimony," 39 HARV. L. REV. 694 (1926); Langeluttig, "Constitutional Limitations on
Administrative Power of Investigation," 28 ILL. L. REv. 508 (1933); Waite, "Inquisitorial Powers of Administrative Tribunals," 12 UNiv. CrNN. L. REV. 164 (1938);
3 Mo. L. REv. 457 (1938).
157
See Hyneman, "Administrative Adjudication: An Analysis," 51 PoL. Ser. Q.
383, 516 (1936). Even where the constitutionality of contempt proceedings before
administrative agencies has been denied, the power of making contempt of board a
crime has generally not been questioned. See Kuhlman v. Superior Court, 122 Cal.
636, 55 P. 589 (1898); Whitcomb's Case, 120 Mass. n8 (1876); State ex rel.
Haughey v. Ryan, 182 Mo. 349, 81 S.W. 435 (1905). See also Lilienthal, "The
Power of Governmental Agencies to Compel Testimony," 39 HARV. L. REv. 694 at
700 (1926). However, it has been said that the limitation of the contempt authority
to the imposition of a fine enforceable only in court is insufficient to avoid constitutional
objections otherwise present. See People v. Swena, 88 Colo. 337, 296 P. 271 (1931).
For the constitutionality of a Congressional act punishing contempt of legislative bodies,
see In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 17 S. Ct. 992 (1896); Landis, "Constitutional
Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation," 40 HARv. L. REv. 153 at
158 (1926); Shull, "Legislative Contempt-An Auxiliary Power of Congress," 8
TEMPLE L.Q. 198 (1934).
158
If no provision is made for the punishment by the administrative agency itself,
the courts would be competent for the punishment. This procedure would be cumbersome. See Lilienthal, "The Power of Governmental Agencies to Compel Testimony," .
39 HARV. L. REv. 694 at 700 (1926). Consequently, the "Brimson device" would
be a better way of compulsion than punishment by the courts.
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trial justices each year are concerned with violations of motor vehicle
or traffic laws, for which the .established doctrines of criminal liability
are not suitable. The number of such cases is increasing rapidly. What
is badly needed is some form of administrative control which will prove
quick, objective and comprehensive.159

IV
THE FUNCTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS

In general, courts have shown a liberal attitude toward the problem whether administrative agencies may participate in the creation of
a criminal offense by rules and regulations and may impose the penalty
for the violation of administrative duties. Is there any justification for
the fact that administrative agencies have been permitted to create certain elements of a criminal offense and, eventually, the penalty? As
so often in the field of administrative law, "necessity" might be one
justification. In addition, it seems that the device of punishment for
the violation of administrative duties is distinguishable from the type
of ordinary crime. In the first place, this "administrative crime" 100 is
not the outbirth of a particular unmoral conduct, but is characterized
by disobedience to administrative duties.161 In the second place, the
function of this "administrative crime" is deterrence rather than retribution.162 The mere existence of the penal sanction should make the
individual comply with his administrative duties.
159

Sayre, "Public Welfare Offenses," 33 CoL. L. REv. 55 at 69 (1933).
concept of an "administrative crime" has been developed by JAMES
GoLDSCHMIDT, DAs VERWALTUNGSSTRAFRECHT 548, 566 (1902); Goldschmidt,
"Das Verwaltungsstrafrecht ins Verhaltnis zur Modernen Staats- und Rechtslehre,"
FESTGABE DER JuRISTISCHEN GEsELLSCHAFT zu BERLIN FUR RrcHARD KocH 415
(1903). Goldschmidt bases his theory on the contention that a crime committed in
violation of administrative duties differs from the ordinary crime. The administrative
crime consists of the omission to support the policy of th'!! state, which is directed
towards the well-being of the state. See also FRITZ TRoPs, BEGRIFF UND WERT EiNES
VERWALTUNGS-STRAFRECHTES (1926); v. Dona, "Beziehungen und Begrenzungen von
Strafrecht und Verwaltungsrecht," 30 VERWALTUNGSARCHIV 233 (1925). Opposed
to the idea of a special concept of "administrative crime" is FRITZ FLEINER, lNsTITUTIONEN DES DEUTSCHEN VERWALTUNGSRECHT, 6th ed., 316 (1939); WALTER JELLINEK, VERWALTUNGSRECHT 322 (1928) (25 Enzyklopadie der Rechts und Staats
Wissenschaft).
161
Sayre, "Public Welfare Offenses," 33 CoL. L. REV. 55 at 79-80 (1933);
also MICHAEL and WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION: CAsEs,
STATUTES AND COMMENTARIES 6-II, 786, 787 (1940).
162 See MONOGRAPHS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CoMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S. Doc. 10, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941), pt. 12, Federal Power
Commission, p. 39, where it is said: "The forfeiture provisions of the act have never
been formally invoked by the Commission but, no doubt, they have some value as
deterrents."
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To what extent should the legislators use the device of the administrative crime? Since the chief interest. of government in the field of
administrative law _is directed toward compliance with administrative
duties, specific performance 'of administrative duties rather than punishment for their violation must be the primary objective, as the distinguished Swiss professor of administrative law, Fritz Fleiner has
urged.163 Consequently, direct compulsion should be exercised for the
purpose of enforcing administrative duties, wherever it is possible.164
For inst~nce, where a person carries on an enterprise without a license,
the enterprise should be closed (direct compulsion). Where a person
is bound to perform an administrative duty which can be carried out
by a third person, it should be done by the third person at the expense
of the individual-who is s.ubject to the administrative duty (substituted
performance) .165 Only in those cases in which neither direct compulsion nor substituted action is possible, should the concept of the "administrative crime" be used, µat as a means of punishment, but as a
means of indirect compulsion. 166 This punishment is not to vindicate
past conduct, but to enforce future conduct. Consequently, it has nothing to do with the ordinary concept of crime. Therefore, a penalty can
be imposed as often as necessary to make the individual comply
with the administrative order, and the prohibition of double jeopardy.
does not apply.167 On the other hand, once the order is complied with,
the penalty can no longer be imposed or exacted. Of course, under this
concept, the penal sanction bec;omes an administrative sanction and the
problems which result from the use of the penal sanction in administrative law no longer exist. Even though punishment as an administrative sanction should be employed, there always would remain a proper
field for the use of the administrative crime as a penal sanction. •
163 FRITZ FLEINER, INSTITUTIONEN DES DEUTSCHEN VERWALTUNGSRECHT, 6th
ed., 216 (1939). He says {translated): "Compulsion and punishment go their own
ways, and it is wrong from a legislative point of view to make the violation of secondary
administrative interests a criminal offense and to resort to punishment, where plain
compulsion would be sufficient."
164 Id. at 222.
165 Id. at 220.
166 Id. at 218, 219.
167 Id. at 219.

